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Cyber Resilience Act: 24-Hour Reporting for Manufacturers Since 11 September 2026

12 min read

Since 11 September 2026, manufacturers of products with digital elements must report actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents through ENISA's Single Reporting Platform within 24 hours. Who is covered, the 24h/72h/final timeline, legacy products and how to get ready.

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On 11 September 2026 the first operational obligation of the Cyber Resilience Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, the CRA) started to apply. Every manufacturer of a product with digital elements sold in the EU must now report actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents affecting that product, with an early warning within 24 hours. Two months on, many Italian and Spanish manufacturers of connected machinery, controllers and software are still working out what this means for them. This article explains the duty as it stands, how it differs from the NIS2 rules covered in our complete NIS2 guide, and what a manufacturer should have in place now, more than a year before the rest of the CRA applies in December 2027.

Key Takeaways

  • Reporting has applied since 11 September 2026; most other CRA obligations apply from 11 December 2027.
  • Two things must be reported: actively exploited vulnerabilities in your product and severe incidents affecting its security.
  • The clock is 24 hours, 72 hours, then a final report (14 days after a fix is available for vulnerabilities, one month for incidents).
  • Products already on the market are covered. The reporting duty is not limited to products placed on the market after 2027.
  • One submission, through ENISA's Single Reporting Platform, reaches the coordinating CSIRT of your Member State and ENISA.

What changed on 11 September 2026

The CRA entered into force on 10 December 2024 and applies in stages. The reporting obligations in Article 14 came first. According to the European Commission's CRA reporting page, "as of 11 September 2026, manufacturers are required to report actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents". ENISA operates the Single Reporting Platform (SRP), whose initial operating capability went live on the same day. ENISA notes that the platform was upgraded to version 1.3 on 4 November 2026, so check the current documentation before relying on any screenshot or older guide.

The rest of the regulation, including the essential cybersecurity requirements, conformity assessment and CE marking for products with digital elements, applies from 11 December 2027.

Who counts as a "manufacturer"

The CRA covers "products with digital elements": hardware or software that connects, directly or indirectly, to a device or a network. In practice that includes a CNC machine with a remote-service modem, a PLC, an industrial gateway, a connected appliance, a mobile app sold with a device, and stand-alone commercial software.

  • The manufacturer is whoever develops or has the product developed and markets it under its own name or trademark.
  • Importers and distributors become manufacturers if they place a product on the market under their own name, or substantially modify it, as McCann FitzGerald summarises. Otherwise the Article 14 reporting duty is not theirs.
  • Location does not matter. The CRA applies to products made available on the EU market, wherever the manufacturer is established.
  • Open-source software stewards have a narrower duty of their own, which applies only to the extent they are involved in developing the products.

For an Italian machinery builder the question is rarely "are we in scope" and more often "which of our products have a digital element, and who owns them internally".

What must be reported, and when

Two events trigger the duty. An actively exploited vulnerability is one for which there is reliable evidence that a malicious actor has exploited it in a system. A severe incident is one that affects, or could affect, the product's ability to protect sensitive or important data or functions, or that has led, or could lead, to malicious code being introduced or executed in the product or in the user's network.

PhaseActively exploited vulnerabilitySevere incident
Early warningWithin 24 hours of becoming awareWithin 24 hours of becoming aware
NotificationWithin 72 hours: product, general nature of the exploit and the vulnerability, corrective or mitigating measuresWithin 72 hours: nature of the incident, initial assessment, measures taken and available to users
Final reportNo later than 14 days after a corrective or mitigating measure is availableWithin one month of the incident notification

The early warning for a severe incident must also say whether it is suspected of being caused by unlawful or malicious acts, and both early warnings list the Member States where the product was made available. The final report for a vulnerability describes its severity and impact, any information on the malicious actor and the security update, as detailed by Hogan Lovells.

Notifications go through the SRP to the CSIRT designated as coordinator in the Member State of your main establishment. ENISA receives them at the same time unless particularly exceptional circumstances apply, and the coordinating CSIRT passes them on to the CSIRTs of the other countries where the product is sold. You report once.

Informing users

Article 14(8) adds a second audience: the manufacturer must inform impacted users of an actively exploited vulnerability or severe incident and, where appropriate, all users, in a structured, machine-readable format where that makes sense. There is no fixed deadline, but if users are not informed in a timely manner, the coordinating CSIRT may inform them itself. A distribution list of customers and installed machines is therefore part of compliance, not a sales asset.

"Actively exploited" in practice

The hardest question is when the 24 hours start. The CRA does not define a detailed awareness threshold. According to Hogan Lovells, the Commission's draft guidance of 3 March 2026 places awareness at the point where the manufacturer has "a reasonable degree of certainty" that a vulnerability is being actively exploited. An unverified rumour does not start the clock; waiting for complete forensic certainty is not acceptable either.

Typical ways a manufacturer becomes aware:

  • A customer's incident response team finds your device or software at the start of an attack chain.
  • A national CSIRT or a security researcher contacts you with evidence.
  • Your product, or a component inside it, appears in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog or in ENISA's European Vulnerability Database.
  • Your own telemetry, device cloud or update server shows exploitation attempts that succeed.

Write down who decides that the threshold is met, with a named deputy for weekends and August. In September, the first reports were filed by companies that had decided this in advance.

Products already on the market are in scope

Article 69(3) extends the reporting duty to every in-scope product made available on the EU market before 11 December 2027. Elsewhere, products placed on the market before that date fall under the CRA only if they are substantially modified. Reporting is the exception: a controller sold in 2019 that is still in the field and actively exploited today must be reported.

For a manufacturer with long-lived products, that means two inventories: the product versions sold over the years, and the third-party components inside them. Without the second, you will not know that a vulnerability in an embedded web server or SSH library affects machines you shipped years ago. Supply chain incidents such as the compromise of the Trivy scanner in March 2026 show how fast a component problem becomes a product problem.

How the CRA differs from NIS2

Cyber Resilience ActNIS2
ObjectThe product with digital elementsThe organisation and its network and information systems
Who reportsThe manufacturer, whatever its size or sectorEssential and important entities in the NIS2 sectors
TriggerActively exploited vulnerability or severe incident affecting the productSignificant incident affecting the entity's services
Timeline24 h, 72 h, final report (14 days after the fix, or one month)24 h, 72 h, final report within one month
ChannelENISA Single Reporting Platform, to the coordinating CSIRT and ENISAThe national CSIRT (CSIRT Italia, INCIBE-CERT or CCN-CERT in Spain)
Maximum fine for these dutiesEUR 15 million or 2.5% of worldwide annual turnoverEUR 10 million or 2% for essential entities; EUR 7 million or 1.4% for important entities

A manufacturer of machinery or electronics may well be a NIS2 important entity too. The same week can then bring two reports: one under the CRA because customers' machines are being exploited, and one under NIS2 because the attacker also reached your own network. Our guide to NIS2 incident reporting covers the second. According to Hogan Lovells, micro and small enterprises cannot be fined for missing the CRA's 24-hour early warning, but the obligation itself still applies to them.

Getting ready: what a manufacturer needs now

1. A product security incident response function

You do not need a large PSIRT, but you do need a team, even two people, that receives vulnerability reports, triages them, decides on exploitation and owns the SRP submission. Publish a security contact on your website and in product documentation, and make sure messages reach someone on duty.

2. An inventory of products, versions and components

List every product with digital elements still in use at customers, its versions and its main software components. The CRA's essential requirements, applicable from December 2027, require a software bill of materials (SBOM) covering at least top-level dependencies in a machine-readable format. Starting now also gives you what you need to judge, quickly, whether a newly exploited library affects you.

3. A decision procedure and templates

Prepare templates for the early warning, the 72-hour notification and the final report, with the fields listed above. Rehearse once with a realistic case: a vulnerability in your remote-access module, exploited at one customer, reported on a Friday evening.

4. A channel to customers

Keep an up-to-date list of who operates which product, and a way to send them advisories in a structured format. Coordinate with distributors, who often hold the customer relationship.

5. Your own internet-facing infrastructure

Many severe incidents start not in the product but in the services around it: the update server, the customer portal, the device cloud and the remote-support gateway. If an attacker can push a malicious update through your distribution server, every machine that trusts it is at risk. These systems belong in your attack surface monitoring, as explained in our guide to external attack surface management.

Where Orizon fits, and where it does not

To be clear about the boundary: Orizon does not perform CRA conformity assessment, firmware analysis or product certification, and does not file SRP notifications for you. What we can do concerns the manufacturer's own internet-facing perimeter:

  • RECON External continuously discovers the domains, hosts and services you expose, such as update servers, customer portals and device clouds, and verifies each finding from an isolated server, marking it Proven, To verify or Closed with the evidence.
  • Fireline, our autonomous external penetration test, tests that same perimeter under a signed Authorisation to Test, chains weaknesses to show real impact and backs every finding with evidence and a CVSS 3.1 score.

Neither replaces your PSIRT, your SBOM or your notification duty. They reduce the chance that the infrastructure around your product becomes the source of a severe incident.

What comes in December 2027

From 11 December 2027 the full CRA applies: products must meet the essential cybersecurity requirements of Annex I before being placed on the market, carry CE marking after the applicable conformity assessment, and be supported with security updates for a support period that, as a rule, lasts at least five years. Vulnerability handling, including the SBOM and a coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy, becomes a requirement for new products. The reporting duty you already have is the first piece of that system.

Checklist

  1. Map which of your products are products with digital elements, including those sold years ago and still in use.
  2. Name an owner for product security and a deputy, and publish a security contact.
  3. Agree internally when "reasonable certainty" of active exploitation is reached, and who decides.
  4. Prepare templates for the 24-hour, 72-hour and final reports, and check access to the Single Reporting Platform.
  5. Build a customer and distributor list for user notifications.
  6. Start a component inventory that will grow into the SBOM required from 2027.
  7. Monitor known-exploited catalogs for the components you ship.
  8. Put your update servers, portals and device clouds under continuous external monitoring.
  9. Check whether you are also a NIS2 entity, and align the two reporting procedures.

If your connected products depend on internet-facing services you are not sure you fully know, RECON External shows what is exposed and which findings are real, and Fireline proves what an attacker could do with them on the perimeter you authorise. We are happy to walk you through both, with no promise of CRA compliance, because no external test can give one.

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