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Italy's Summer 2026 Defacement Wave: WordPress, Joomla and cPanel Flaws

12 min read

A look back at the June to September 2026 defacement campaigns reported by ACN: the JCE flaw behind the Joomla wave, the WordPress Pods plugin, exposed cPanel servers, and how to detect, recover and prevent a hacked website.

defacement
wordpress

Between June and September 2026, dozens of Italian websites woke up showing someone else's page. Looking back from November, the pattern that ACN, Italy's National Cybersecurity Agency, describes in its monthly reports is clear: local councils, universities, research bodies, associations and small businesses were not chosen for who they were, but for the software they ran. A Joomla editor extension in June and July, a WordPress plugin in August, and a hosting control panel exposed on thousands of Italian servers. This article reconstructs the wave from CSIRT Italia's own reports, explains why plugins and hosting panels keep being the way in, and gives you a recovery and prevention plan you can apply this week. If you are new to the idea of managing everything you expose online, start with our guide to external attack surface management.

Key Takeaways
  • In July 2026 a campaign defaced more than 60 Joomla sites, mostly local public administrations, through CVE-2026-48907 in the Joomla Content Editor (JCE) extension, according to ACN.
  • In August ACN linked further defacements to a critical flaw in the WordPress Pods plugin (CVE-2026-19598, CSIRT Italia alert AL08/260821).
  • In the same month CSIRT Italia counted 9,121 Italian systems and services at risk, 5,911 more than in July, mainly cPanel services potentially vulnerable to CVE-2026-65643.
  • Targets were picked by the vulnerability they exposed, not by sector. If you run an unpatched plugin on a public site, you are in scope.
  • A defacement proves that someone could write to your web server. Restoring the homepage is not recovery: finding the entry point and rebuilding clean is.

What happened in summer 2026

ACN publishes an Operational Summary every month, with the events and incidents handled by CSIRT Italia and the most serious vulnerabilities of the period. Read together with the vendor advisories and the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, the June, July and August material describes one story in three acts.

Date (2026)EventSource
3 JuneJCE 2.9.99.5 released, the first fix for the editor-profile flawJCE vendor advisory
12 JuneJCE advisory: the flaw is actively exploited, working exploit code is public and attacks are automatedJCE vendor advisory
15 JuneCSIRT Italia alert on the active exploitation of CVE-2026-48907 in JCEACN, July summary
16 JuneCVE-2026-48907 added to the CISA KEV catalogCISA KEV
JulyMore than 60 Joomla sites defaced, mainly local public administrationsACN, July summary
7 JulyJoomlack Page Builder CVE-2026-56290 added to KEVCISA KEV
17 JulyWordPress 7.0.2 security release, with forced automatic updatesWordPress.org
21 JulyWordPress core CVE-2026-60137 and CVE-2026-63030 added to KEVCISA KEV
21 AugustCSIRT Italia alert AL08/260821 on the WordPress Pods pluginACN, August summary
28 AugustCSIRT Italia alert AL09/260828 on cPanel CVE-2026-65643ACN, August summary
28 SeptemberACN publishes the August Operational SummaryACN

June and July: one Joomla extension, more than 60 sites

JCE is one of the most widely used editors for Joomla. In its security advisory of 12 June 2026 the vendor explained that an attacker could get an editor profile onto the site that allowed executable files to be uploaded, and then upload one. The CISA KEV entry describes the same flaw as the upload and execution of PHP code through the creation of new editor profiles by unauthenticated users. The vendor did not mince words: the vulnerability was being actively exploited, working exploit code was public and the attacks were automated. The first fix, JCE 2.9.99.5, had shipped on 3 June; the vendor recommended 2.9.99.9 for every site and offered a free patch for the 2.7.x, 2.8.x and 2.9.x branches, warning that it closes the hole but does not clean a site that has already been compromised.

CSIRT Italia issued its alert on 15 June. In July, according to the ACN Operational Summary for July 2026, a defacement campaign hit more than 60 Joomla-based websites, mainly belonging to local public administrations but also to research bodies, universities and technology companies. ACN described it as opportunistic: targets were selected by the vulnerability they exposed, not by their sector. The impact was limited to the alteration of some pages, with no effect on operations or service continuity, and the altered pages merely attested the compromise without hacktivist messages. ACN confirmed that CVE-2026-48907 was actually exploited in the July campaign, and that vulnerability exploitation was the main initial access vector of the month.

Note the gap. The fix existed from 3 June and the national alert from 15 June. The sites defaced in July had simply not applied it.

August: the WordPress Pods plugin and cPanel

The August 2026 Operational Summary, published on 28 September, counts 309 events (+1% on July) and 185 incidents. Continuing what was seen in July, proactive monitoring found defacements on several dozen websites of local administrations, research bodies, universities, associations and small businesses, caused by the exploitation of vulnerabilities in plugins and other components of content management systems. Again there was no operational impact and no claim of responsibility. ACN highlights the CSIRT Italia alert of 21 August on the active exploitation of a critical vulnerability in the Pods plugin for WordPress, which was actually used in some of the defacements observed that month.

According to ICT Security Magazine's summary of alert AL08/260821, the flaw is CVE-2026-19598, an Incorrect Authorization issue with a CVSS v3.1 score of 9.8 in the plugin's pods_admin AJAX component: an unauthenticated remote user could create an account with administrator privileges by sending HTTP POST requests to admin-ajax.php. An administrator account on a WordPress site is full control of the site.

The same report shows how quickly the exposed surface can change. CSIRT Italia's monitoring identified 9,121 Italian systems and services at risk in August, 5,911 more than in July. ACN attributes the increase mainly to the large number of cPanel services potentially vulnerable to CVE-2026-65643 (alert AL09/260828), an eval injection flaw that would allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code. In August CSIRT Italia sent 2,666 direct communications to the organisations exposing those services. The alert list of the month also includes CVE-2026-64638 in WordPress, a pre-authentication reflected XSS in the login component (CVSS v4.0 8.9) that needs the victim to be lured to a crafted page.

How to read the numbers

ICT Security Magazine, reading the August report, puts defacements at +181% compared with the average of the previous six months. ACN itself adds an important caveat: the increase is also due to CSIRT Italia's new capability to detect this kind of activity quickly on Italian websites. Part of the growth measures the observer, not only the phenomenon. That does not make the wave less real. It means that some of these compromises were happening before, and nobody was counting them.

Why plugins are the weak spot

The core of WordPress and Joomla is maintained by large teams, reviewed by many eyes and, in WordPress's case, updated automatically for security releases: for 7.0.2 the WordPress.org team even forced the update on affected sites. Plugins and extensions are a different world.

  • Many authors, uneven quality. A typical small-business site runs a dozen or more plugins from different developers, some maintained by one person, some abandoned.
  • Each plugin adds code anyone can call. AJAX handlers, REST routes, upload forms, editor profiles. Pods was reachable through admin-ajax.php; JCE through its profile mechanism. Every one of these is an entry point that does not need a password unless the plugin checks for one correctly.
  • Updates are often manual. Agencies build the site, hand it over and move on. Nobody owns the update.
  • Deactivated is not removed. A deactivated plugin is still on disk, and its files can still be requested directly if they do not protect themselves.
  • Attacks are automated. Once a working exploit is public, scanners sweep the internet for the vulnerable component. The JCE vendor said so explicitly.

The core is not immune either. In 2026 the KEV catalog lists WordPress core flaws added on 21 July (CVE-2026-60137 and CVE-2026-63030, which chained together allow unauthenticated remote code execution on default installations), on 25 September (CVE-2026-87902, a local PHP file inclusion leading to code execution) and on 3 November (CVE-2026-119977, a race condition during the core upgrade window, fixed in 7.1.4). CVE-2026-60137 is triggered when a plugin or theme passes untrusted input to core: plugins and core fail together.

Component2026 vulnerabilityWhat it allowedFix
Joomla Content Editor (JCE)CVE-2026-48907Upload and execution of PHP code via new editor profiles, without authentication2.9.99.5 or later; 2.9.99.9 recommended
Joomlack Page BuilderCVE-2026-56290Unauthenticated arbitrary file upload leading to code executionVendor update
WordPress Pods pluginCVE-2026-19598Creation of an administrator account without authenticationFixed release named in alert AL08/260821
WordPress coreCVE-2026-60137 + CVE-2026-63030Chained unauthenticated code execution on default installations7.0.2, or backports 6.9.5 and 6.8.6
WordPress coreCVE-2026-87902Inclusion of a local PHP file leading to code executionFixed core release per the WordPress advisory
cPanel & WHM, WP2CVE-2026-41940Authentication bypass in the login flow; known ransomware usecPanel security update of 28 April 2026
cPanelCVE-2026-65643Eval injection with arbitrary code executionUpdate per alert AL09/260828

For WordPress 7.0.2, the release notes state that 6.9 was affected by both issues, 6.8 by the first only, and versions before 6.8 by neither.

The hosting panel is part of your perimeter

Many small organisations think of "the website" as the CMS. An attacker sees the whole server: the hosting control panel, webmail, FTP, database administration tools and SSH, all answering on the same IP address. A flaw in the panel skips the CMS entirely and gives access to every site, mailbox and database in the account.

2026 made the point several times. CVE-2026-41940, an authentication bypass in the cPanel & WHM login flow, entered the KEV catalog on 30 April with ransomware use marked as known: a compromised panel is not only a defacement risk. The LiteSpeed cPanel plugin gained two KEV entries, a privilege escalation (CVE-2026-48172, 26 May) and a symbolic link following flaw (CVE-2026-54420, 15 June). On shared hosting, flaws like these are what let one compromised account reach its neighbours. And in August cPanel alone drove Italy's count of exposed services at risk from 3,210 to 9,121.

If your site is hosted by a provider or managed by an agency, ask them in writing:

  • Who patches the panel, the web server and PHP, and within how many days of a critical advisory?
  • Can the panel and WHM be restricted to known IP addresses or reached only through a VPN?
  • Is multi-factor authentication enforced for the panel and for the hosting account?
  • Will they tell you when CSIRT Italia or another source flags your server?

Detection: you often learn about it from someone else

ACN notes that the August incidents were promptly reported to the organisations concerned. In other words, many victims learned of the defacement from CSIRT Italia, not from their own monitoring. Others hear it from a customer, a citizen, a journalist or a browser warning. If the message comes from CSIRT Italia, our article on what to do in the first 24 hours when CSIRT Italia flags your exposed service walks you through the response.

You can shorten the window yourself with a few inexpensive controls:

  • Content and integrity monitoring: an external check that alerts when the homepage or key pages change unexpectedly, and file integrity monitoring on the web root.
  • New administrator accounts: an alert whenever an admin user is created. In the Pods case, a new administrator was the attack.
  • Executable files where they do not belong: PHP files in upload directories (wp-content/uploads in WordPress, images or media folders in Joomla) are a classic sign of a web shell.
  • Web server logs: bursts of POST requests to admin-ajax.php, to editor or upload endpoints, from addresses you do not recognise.
  • Search engine warnings: the security issues report in Google Search Console often flags injected content before you see it.

Recovery: what to do after a defacement

The instinct is to restore the homepage and move on. Resist it. If an attacker could change a page, they could most likely run code on the server, read the database and leave a way back in.

  1. Contain: put the site in maintenance mode or take it offline. Take a snapshot of files, database and logs before you change anything.
  2. Preserve evidence: web server access and error logs, CMS logs, hosting panel and FTP logs. Write down when the defacement was noticed and by whom.
  3. Find the entry point: compare the versions of core, plugins and extensions with the advisories above. Look at the logs around the timestamp of the first modified file.
  4. Look for persistence: web shells and recently modified PHP files, rogue administrator accounts, new FTP or panel users, cron jobs added in the panel, altered .htaccess files.
  5. Rebuild clean: fresh core from the official source, every plugin re-downloaded from its official source at the patched version, content restored from a backup that predates the compromise and has been checked. Overwriting the defaced page is not a rebuild.
  6. Rotate every credential: CMS administrators, the database user, FTP and SFTP, the hosting panel and hosting account, plus the secrets and salts in wp-config.php or configuration.php and any API keys stored on the server.
  7. Assess data and obligations: if the attacker could run code, assume they could read the database. If personal data may have been compromised, the GDPR requires notifying the supervisory authority within 72 hours of becoming aware of a breach that is likely to result in a risk to people. If your organisation falls under NIS2, check whether the incident must be notified: our guide to NIS2 incident reporting explains the timelines.
  8. Patch, harden and monitor before you put the site back online, then watch the logs closely for the following weeks.

Prevention: inventory, updates, fewer plugins

  • Know every site you have. The main website is rarely the problem. Old campaign microsites, a forgotten event site, the staging copy an agency left on a subdomain: these are the sites nobody patches. Keep a list of every site and subdomain with its CMS, version, plugins and the person responsible.
  • Update on a clock. Enable automatic updates for core and, where you trust them, for plugins. Subscribe to CSIRT Italia alerts and to the advisories of the components you use. Anything that enters the KEV catalog should be patched in days, not at the next maintenance window.
  • Remove, do not deactivate. Every plugin you do not use is code you still expose. Prefer actively maintained plugins with a visible security contact.
  • Lock the doors that matter. Multi-factor authentication for CMS administrators and for the hosting panel. Restrict /wp-admin, /administrator, cPanel and WHM to known addresses or a VPN where your organisation allows it.
  • Use a web application firewall as a seatbelt. Virtual patching buys time between disclosure and update. It does not replace the update.
  • Keep backups off the server and test restores. A backup stored in the same hosting account is in the attacker's reach.
  • Put it in the contract. If an agency or provider maintains the site, write down patching times for critical vulnerabilities and who monitors the alerts.

For sites that handle logins, payments or personal data, an automated scan is not enough on its own: a periodic test of the application logic is part of prevention. Our article on web application penetration testing explains what such a test covers.

Checklist

  • List every website and subdomain, with CMS, version, plugins and owner.
  • Check JCE (2.9.99.5 or later), Joomlack Page Builder, WordPress Pods and WordPress core (7.0.2, 6.9.5 or 6.8.6 at minimum, then the later fixed releases).
  • Ask your hosting provider about CVE-2026-41940 and CVE-2026-65643 on cPanel, and about the LiteSpeed cPanel plugin.
  • Delete unused plugins and themes.
  • Enable multi-factor authentication on CMS admins and on the hosting panel.
  • Restrict administrative interfaces to known addresses or a VPN.
  • Set alerts for new admin accounts and for unexpected changes to key pages.
  • Search upload directories for PHP files.
  • Store backups outside the hosting account and test one restore.
  • Write down who calls whom if CSIRT Italia or a customer reports a defacement.

How Orizon can help

The summer of 2026 showed that the sites that get hit are often the ones nobody remembered. RECON External starts from your domain name alone and finds every subdomain, open port and web service you expose, records the technologies it detects on each host, recognises login and admin panels by their favicon even on unusual ports, and shows where your sites ask for a password, with a screenshot of each page. Detected products are matched to known CVEs and weighed by CISA KEV and EPSS, then each finding is tested from an isolated server with read-only proofs and marked Proven, To verify or Closed. It does not watch your page content and it does not replace patching: it tells you what is exposed and which problems are real, so you patch the right things first. Your first three domain scans are free.

When you need to know what an attacker could actually do with a web application, Fireline runs an autonomous penetration test on the external perimeter you authorise, after a signed Authorisation to Test, and backs every finding with evidence; its compliance edition maps confirmed findings to the OWASP Top 10. To place all of this in a wider programme, go back to our external attack surface management guide.

defacement
wordpress
joomla
cpanel
cms-security
csirt-italia