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Breaches through suppliers: Inditex, Naturgy and third-party risk in Spain

12 min read

What Inditex and Naturgy said about the 2026 breaches at their technology providers, why data held by a supplier is your exposure, what GDPR already requires, what NIS2 will add once Spain transposes it, and a minimum third-party programme you can start now.

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In spring 2026 two of Spain's best-known companies told their customers about unauthorised access to data that sat not in their own systems, but at a technology provider. Inditex did so on 16 April; Naturgy on 1 May. Neither case was the largest breach of the year, and both companies stressed that their own systems were not affected. That is exactly why they are worth studying: for most organisations today, the next data breach is more likely to start at a supplier than in their own data centre. This article sets out what each company said and nothing more, then turns to the practical question for Spanish and Italian mid-sized companies: how do you manage a risk that lives in someone else's infrastructure, in a country that still has no NIS2 law? For the regulatory background, see our article on NIS2 supply chain security.

Key Takeaways

  • Both breaches started at a provider. Inditex reported access to its databases "hosted by a third party"; Naturgy reported access to "a database of a provider", stating that its own systems and customer passwords were not involved.
  • Third parties are now in almost half of breaches. The 2026 Verizon DBIR puts third-party involvement at 48% of breaches, up from 30%, and at 54% in Europe, the Middle East and Africa.
  • GDPR already makes you responsible. The controller must notify the AEPD within 72 hours of becoming aware of a breach, even when it happened at a processor.
  • Spain has no NIS2 law yet, and the Commission referred it to the EU Court of Justice on 8 July 2026. The supply-chain duties of Article 21 will arrive; the work they require takes months.
  • Ask suppliers for evidence, not questionnaires, and start with the few that hold your customers' data.

What each company said

Inditex, 16 April 2026

Inditex stated that it had "identified unauthorised access to databases of its organisation hosted by a third party". According to the company, those databases contain information about the commercial relationship with customers in several markets, but in no case names and surnames, telephone numbers, addresses, passwords, bank cards or other means of payment. It said it applied its security protocols immediately, began notifying the relevant authorities, and that its operations and systems were not affected (FashionUnited, El Español). Press coverage attributed the incident to a former technology provider.

Naturgy, 1 May 2026

Naturgy confirmed on X that it had "detected unauthorised access to a database of a provider", that the incident "does not affect passwords or credentials of the Customer Area and does not come from its own systems", and that it had activated its protocol, informed authorities and customers, and reinforced its security measures (Euronews). Spanish media reported that around 3% of its customers in Spain could be affected and that the database included bank details. On 4 May the consumer organisation OCU warned of a high risk of SMS and phone fraud from criminals posing as Naturgy or as the customer's bank.

The context: energy in January

The energy sector had already been through this. On 12 January 2026 Endesa informed customers of Endesa Energía and Energía XXI of unauthorised access to a database containing names, contact details, ID numbers, supply contract data and, in some cases, IBANs; its investigation found that customer passwords were not compromised, and it informed the AEPD and the security forces (Law&Trends). The public information does not say whether a provider was involved.

Figures on the number of records circulating in criminal forums for these cases have not been confirmed by the companies, and we do not repeat them.

The pattern: your supplier's database is your exposure

Customers do not distinguish between a company and its providers, and neither does the law. The CRM, the marketing platform, the billing or collections provider, the call centre and the agency that built the loyalty app may all hold copies of your customers' data. Each copy has its own passwords, its own patch level, its own staff and its own subcontractors.

The 2026 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report, which analysed more than 22,000 confirmed breaches between November 2024 and October 2025, measures how fast this risk is growing:

  • breaches with third-party involvement reached 48%, up from 30% the year before;
  • in Europe, the Middle East and Africa the figure is 54%;
  • only 23% of third-party organisations fully fixed missing or poorly configured MFA on their cloud accounts; for weak passwords and permission misconfigurations, resolving half of the findings took almost eight months.

The last point matters most for a buyer. The weaknesses at your suppliers are often well known, and they stay open for months because nobody outside the supplier asks to see them closed.

GDPR already applies, in full

Spain may not have its NIS2 law, but the obligations triggered by a supplier breach of personal data are already in force:

  • Article 28 GDPR: a processor may only be used under a contract that guarantees appropriate security measures, regulates subprocessors and requires assistance with breach notification.
  • Article 33(2): the processor must notify the controller "without undue delay" after becoming aware of a breach.
  • Article 33(1): the controller notifies the supervisory authority, the AEPD in Spain, within 72 hours of becoming aware of it, unless the breach is unlikely to result in a risk.
  • Article 34: when the risk to people is high, the controller must also tell the affected individuals.

The practical consequence: your 72 hours start when you know, and you will only know quickly if the contract and the relationship make your supplier tell you quickly. A notification clause with no named contact, no deadline in hours and no test is a clause that will not work when it is needed.

What NIS2 will add once Spain transposes it

Spain did not meet the transposition deadline of 17 October 2024. The Council of Ministers approved the draft Ley de Coordinación y Gobernanza de la Ciberseguridad on 14 January 2025, and on 8 July 2026 the European Commission referred Spain, together with Ireland, France and the Netherlands, to the Court of Justice of the EU, asking for a lump sum and daily penalties until transposition is complete (European Commission).

When the law arrives, entities in scope will have to apply Article 21(2)(d) of the directive: security of the supply chain, including the security aspects of the relationship with each direct supplier. Article 21(3) is more specific: entities must take into account the vulnerabilities specific to each supplier, the overall quality of their products and their cybersecurity practices, including secure development procedures. That is a long way from a yearly questionnaire, and it takes months to build. Our comparison of NIS2 and GDPR explains how the two regimes fit together.

If you are an Italian group with subsidiaries in Spain, the asymmetry is real: the Italian parent already works under D.Lgs. 138/2024 and its ACN deadlines, while the Spanish subsidiary has no national NIS2 rules. The sensible choice is to run one third-party programme across both countries.

What to ask suppliers: evidence, not questionnaires

A questionnaire tells you what a supplier believes about itself. Evidence tells you what is true on a given date. For the suppliers that hold your customers' data or have access to your systems, ask for:

Instead of askingAsk for
"Do you manage vulnerabilities?"A recent, dated report on their internet-facing perimeter, with the open findings and their remediation dates
"Do you use MFA?"Confirmation that MFA covers every account with access to your data, including administrators and support staff
"Do you have an incident procedure?"The named contact, the notification deadline in hours, and the date of their last exercise
"Do you use subprocessors?"The list of subprocessors that hold your data, and where
"Do you delete data at the end of the contract?"A deletion certificate for data you no longer need them to hold

A report from an independent tool is the most useful piece of evidence on this list, because it is dated and can be compared over time. Ask the supplier to run it on their own perimeter and share the result. Do not scan a supplier's systems yourself without their written authorisation: it is their infrastructure, and in most jurisdictions testing it without consent is unlawful.

A minimum third-party programme

  1. Find the copies of your data. List every supplier that stores or processes customer or employee data, starting from accounts payable and the record of processing activities, not from memory.
  2. Classify by impact. Three tiers are enough: suppliers holding personal data at scale or bank details, suppliers with access to your network or cloud, and everyone else.
  3. Fix the contracts of the first tier. Notification within hours to a named contact, cooperation with forensics, a list of subprocessors, deletion at the end of the relationship, and the right to ask for evidence.
  4. Ask for evidence once a year, and after every significant incident in the news involving that supplier or its technology.
  5. Minimise. The data a supplier does not hold cannot leak. Remove old exports, close accounts of former suppliers and shorten retention periods.
  6. Prepare the customer message. When the breach is at a supplier, your customers will still hear about it from you. Prepare the template, the FAQ and the warning about phone and SMS fraud before you need them.
  7. Look after your own perimeter. Suppliers often connect to you through portals, VPNs and integrations that you expose. Those are your responsibility.

Where Orizon fits

Start with what you control. RECON External maps every subdomain, port and service your domains expose to the internet, including supplier-managed portals and forgotten integrations, and tests each finding from an isolated server, marking it Proven, To verify or Closed with the evidence attached. It shows what exists and is reachable; it does not attack.

For critical suppliers, the most practical step is to ask them for the same kind of evidence on their own perimeter: a recent RECON report or a Fireline penetration test report on the external perimeter they authorise. Fireline only runs on a perimeter covered by a signed Authorisation to Test. Its Spanish reports use the ENS measures and the RD 43/2021 incident taxonomy, and its compliance edition cross-references confirmed findings to NIS2 Article 21. It never claims compliance on anyone's behalf.

Checklist for the next 30 days

  1. Export the list of suppliers that process personal data from your record of processing activities.
  2. Mark the five that would hurt most if their database leaked.
  3. Read their breach-notification clauses: deadline in hours, named contact, subprocessors.
  4. Send each of the five a request for dated evidence on their perimeter and their MFA coverage.
  5. Delete or recover data held by former suppliers.
  6. Review your own external perimeter, including the portals suppliers use to reach you.
  7. Draft the customer message and the anti-fraud warning for a supplier breach.

Supplier breaches will keep happening; what you control is how much of your data they hold, how fast you learn about it and what you can prove about your own side. If you want to start from your perimeter, run RECON External on your domains; if a client or regulator asks you for proof of impact on an authorised scope, Fireline produces it.

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